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Although climate change litigation is rapidly increasing worldwide, and despite Africa being 
one of the regions predicted to be most severely affected by climate change, the continent has 
not yet seen any significant growth in this specialized form of litigation. Only a comparatively 
small number of court cases have to date been recognized as climate change conflicts in Africa. 
While briefly reflecting on possible reasons for this surprising trend, the primary objective of 
this article is to offer a first comprehensive interrogation of the state and future prospects of 
climate change litigation in Africa with a focus on three cases from South Africa, Uganda and 
Nigeria. The analysis commences with a characterization of current trends in and forms of 
climate change litigation that are emerging the world over, including a brief assessment of the 
types of climate change conflicts that are usually litigated, and the challenges and advantages 
associated with this specialized form of litigation. The article then offers a discussion of the 
unique nature of climate change impacts in Africa and assesses how this could shape the type 
of litigable climate change conflicts on the continent. Drawing on three cases from the 
countries mentioned above, and mindful of the risk of over-generalizing, the authors highlight 
and critically reflect on possible emerging climate change litigation trends in African courts, 
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Climate change litigation is a fairly recent addition to the broader portfolio of environmental 
judicial dispute resolution; but it is an important addition that has been ‘transformed from a 
creative lawyering strategy to a major force in transnational regulatory governance of 
greenhouse gas emissions’.1 This specialized form of litigation has its roots predominantly in 
the United States; a country which also boasts the highest number of climate change cases.2 
Outside of the United States, the bulk of climate change litigation is occurring in countries such 
as Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom,3 with landmark 
and highly publicized cases such as Urgenda Foundation v Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
its recent appeal, decided in the Netherlands.4 By comparison, fewer (although often ground-
breaking)5 cases have been litigated in developing countries such as India, Micronesia, 
Philippines, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Pakistan.6 Lagging substantially behind these and 
other regions in the world is Africa. This is surprising considering the continent’s size that 
spans 54 independently recognized states and the high levels of vulnerability of its people and 
ecosystems to climate change. In tandem with, and possibly consequential on, the muted 
incidence of climate law cases, is the lack of extensive Africa-focused climate change litigation 
scholarship compared to the burgeoning scholarship focusing on other regions, with Africa and 
its few cases often mentioned only in passing, and the surrounding doctrinal issues being 
pushed to the periphery of scientific interest. A recent study concludes ‘while the number of 
legal cases in the Global South has been growing in quantity and importance (e.g., Pakistan, 
India, the Philippines, South Africa, Colombia, and Brazil), these are yet to receive much 
scholarly attention.’7 
 
1  William C. G. Burns & Hari M. Osofsky, Overview: The Exigencies that Drive Potential Causes of Action 
for Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACHES 1 (2009). See, also Joana Setzer & Lisa Vanhala, Climate Change Litigation: A Review of 
Research on Courts and Litigants in Climate Governance WIRES: CLIMATE CHANGE (2019).  
2  Michael Gerrard & Meredith Wilensky, The Role of National Courts in GHG Emissions Reductions, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: VOLUME I 359-71 (2016); Julia Schatz, Climate Change Litigation in Canada and 
the US, 18 RECIEL 129 (2009); and most recently, Joana Setzer & Rebecca Byrnes, Global Trends in 
Climate Change Litigation: 2019 Snapshot (2019), http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/GRI_Global-trends-in-climate-change-litigation-2019-snapshot-2.pdf. 
3  Meredith Wilensky, Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-U.S. Climate Litigation, 26 
DUKE ENVTL L. & POL'Y F. 131 (2015). 
4  Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands [2015] HAZA C/09/00456689. In this case, the 
District Court of the Hague found that the state has a duty to embark on climate change mitigation measures 
due to ‘the severity of the consequences of climate change and the great risk of climate change occurring’. 
At para 4.83 in the unofficial translation available at http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-
litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2015/20150624_2015-HAZA-
C0900456689_decision-1.pdf. On 9 October 2018, the Hague Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's 
ruling. Available at http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2018/20181009_2015-HAZA-C0900456689_decision-
4.pdf. 
5  For example, the Pakistani case Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (W.P. No. 25501/2015), Lahore 
High Court Green Bench, Orders of 4 and 14 September 2015 (hereinafter Ashgar Leghari). 
6  See Sabin Centre for Climate Change Law, Non-U.S. Jurisdiction (2019), http://climatecasechart.com/non-
us-jurisdiction/. 
7  Setzer & Vanhala, supra note 1 at 4-5. But there are examples suggesting that more focused scholarship is 
emerging such as Jean-Claude Ashukem, Setting the Scene for Climate Change Litigation in South Africa: 
Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others [2017] ZAGPPHC 58 
(2017) 65662/16, 13 LEAD 37 (2017); Tracy-Lynn Humby, The Thabametsi Case: Case No 65662/16 
Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs, 30 JEL 145 (2018); and some Africa-
focused chapters in Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann & Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting eds., 
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This is, however, not to say that courts in Africa have not been playing an important and 
often active role in mediating environmental conflicts on the continent. Although there are 
numerous and legitimate concerns in some African countries related to the lack of the rule of 
law, judicial independence and access to courts, many litigants and domestic courts in Africa 
have been innovatively engaging with broader environmental and related socio-economic 
disputes over the years, sometimes with trailblazing precedent-setting effect.8 For example, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACommHPR), in its widely celebrated 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) Communication, was the first judicial 
forum globally to pronounce in detail on a regional right to a healthy environment and related 
rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 (ACHPR).9 According to 
the Communication, the military government of Nigeria had been directly involved in oil 
production through the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Company, and those 
operations caused environmental contamination which led to health problems among the Ogoni 
people (an indigenous community) resulting from environmental contamination. A major 
hallmark of the Communication is the ACommHPR’s elaboration of a range of qualitative 
standards of obligation that the Charter’s right to a healthy environment creates, manifesting 
at ‘four levels of duties for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty 
to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights’.10 Another example is human rights case 
law emanating from South African courts, which is often considered a model elsewhere on the 
continent and in the world on the basis of the judiciary’s creative engagement with 
environmental and related socio-economic rights issues.11  
Civil society activism in some African countries is also increasing playing an important role 
in holding governments to account for environment-related human rights abuses. The increased 
involvement of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in litigating 
environmental harms, and their limited but steadily growing success, is a case in point.12 An 
example is the victory of the Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for 
Economic and Social Rights in their actio popularis against the Nigerian government and Shell 
 
CLIMATE CHANGE: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. VOLUME 1. LEGAL RESPONSES AND 
GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY (2013). 
8  See Louis J. Kotzé & Alexander Paterson eds., THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2009). 
9  ACHPR 155/96: Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social 
Rights (CESR) / Nigeria 2001 (hereinafter ACHPR 155/96). According to the Communication, the military 
government of Nigeria had been directly involved in oil production through the state-owned Nigerian 
National Petroleum Company in which Shell Petroleum company has a major stake, and those operations 
caused environmental contamination which led to health problems among the Ogoni people. It was alleged 
that a number of avoidable oil spills had occurred with resultant pollution of water, soil and air. The 
Communication alleged the violation, among others, of articles 16 (the right to health), 21 (the right to the 
free disposal of wealth and resources), and article 24 (the right to a healthy environment) of the ACHPR. 
The ACommHPR ultimately found that the Nigerian government had failed to uphold the many human 
rights duties it derives from the ACHPR. Louis J. Kotzé & Anél du Plessis, The African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights and Environmental Rights Standards, in ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS 93-115 (2019). 
10  ACHPR 155/96, supra note 9, at para 44. 
11  See Louis J. Kotzé & Anél du Plessis, Some Brief Observations on Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights 
Jurisprudence in South Africa, 3 J COURT INNOV 157 (2010); Oliver Fuo & Anél du Plessis, In the Face 
of Judicial Deference: Taking the ‘Minimum Core’ of Socio-Economic Rights to the Local Government 
Sphere, 19 LDD 1 (2015). 
12  See among the many publications in this respect Thomas Princen & Matthias Finger, ENVIRONMENTAL 
NGOS IN WORLD POLITICS: LINKING THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL (1994). 
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Petroleum Company in the SERAC Communication.13 In view of this trend, and considering 
that climate change conflicts and their litigation are often championed by civil society actors, 
one would have expected a much higher incidence of and frequency in climate change litigation 
on the African continent. 
Moreover, Africa is among the regions of the world projected to suffer most from the 
impacts of climate change while being the least able to adapt to its impacts and to bolster the 
resilience of people and ecosystems to changing climatic conditions.14 Africa is thus 
particularly susceptible to climate change conflicts arising in many socio-economic and 
environmental contexts, leading one intuitively to expect that such conflicts, including those 
that are predisposed to being litigated in court, will emerge much more frequently than is 
currently the case. In response to climate change on the continent, a considerable number of 
African countries has ratified the Paris Climate Agreement,15 and numerous African countries 
have developed environmental and climate change policies and laws,16 suggesting that at least 
some public and private sector legal obligations do exist with respect to climate change. As is 
the case elsewhere around the globe, it is highly unlikely that these obligations are always 
entirely and diligently observed by everyone everywhere, thus presumably providing the legal 
foundation, including appropriate remedies, to adjudicate matters and conflicts that arise from 
non-observance of such obligations. Yet, judging from the absence of climate change litigation 
on the continent, it does not appear as if the available domestic legal and policy frameworks 
have yet been utilized to their full extent and force. 
While a thorough study of the reasons behind the lack of climate change litigation in Africa 
is undoubtedly a worthwhile project, it is not one we pursue here. What we instead aim to do 
is to offer the first in-depth comparative survey of climate change litigation in Africa. Drawing 
from a wealth of existing literature on this issue, the analysis is set against, and commences in 
Part 2 immediately below, with a characterization of current trends in and forms of climate 
change litigation that are emerging the world over, including a brief assessment of the types of 
climate change conflicts that are usually litigated and the challenges and advantages associated 
with this specialized form of litigation.  
Part 3 of the article then offers a discussion of the unique nature of climate change impacts 
in Africa and assesses how this may shape the type of litigable climate change conflicts that 
might arise on the continent.  
Part 4 analyses in some detail three climate cases in South Africa, Nigeria and Uganda. In 
the absence of generally accepted criteria that determine what a climate change case is, we 
focus for present purposes on the three cases that are included in the authoritative Sabin Centre 
for Climate Change Law database and that have been recognized in the literature as climate 
change cases.17 This includes two cases that have already been decided, namely in South 
Africa, Earthlife Africa v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others (Thabametsi);18 and in 
Nigeria, Gbemre v Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd. and Others 
 
13  Morné van der Linde & Lirette Louw, Considering the Interpretation and Implementation of Article 24 of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Light of the SERAC Communication, 3 AHRLJ 167 
(2003). 
14  Paul Collier, Gordon Conway & Tony Venables, Climate Change and Africa, 24 OXFORD REV ECON POL 
337 (2008). 
15  United Nations Climate Change, Paris Agreement (2015), 
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php. 
16  Michal Nachmany et al., THE GLOBE CLIMATE LEGISLATION STUDY: A REVIEW OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
LEGISLATION IN 66 COUNTRIES (4th ed. 2014). 
17  See Sabin Centre for Climate Change Law, supra note 6. 
18  Earthlife Africa v. Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others, Unreported Case No. 65662/16 (Gauteng 
High Court Pretoria, 8 March 2017) (hereinafter Thabametsi).
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(Gbemre).19 In Uganda, the case of Mbabazi and Others v The Attorney General and National 
Environmental Management Authority (Mbabazi)20 is still in its preparatory phase and the 
decision remains pending at the time of writing. This case, more than its South African and 
Nigerian counterparts, could resemble a form of climate trust litigation that is emerging 
elsewhere in the world.21 We agree with Setzer and Vanhala that ‘the pre-litigation stage of 
mobilizing the law can be enormously impactful, and has the power to shape policy …  in ways 
that until now have remained invisible to scholars.’22 Therefore, despite its not having being 
heard yet, we provide brief thoughts on the Mbabazi case based on available pre-trail materials 
since we believe it could offer useful insights into the potential of climate trust litigation in 
Africa.  
Mindful of the risk of over-generalizing, and to the extent that these are evident, Part 5 
concludes the discussion by means of a comparison by highlighting emerging climate change 
litigation trends in African courts, while also comparing them to the more generic trends 
emerging worldwide that were identified in Part 2. In the final instance, the discussion critically 
reflects on the state of and future prospects for climate change litigation on the continent. 
 
 
2 Litigating climate change: a synopsis 
 
The legal dimensions of climate change have really come to the fore only in the 1990s with the 
worldwide, if not universal, adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change in 1992 (UNFCCC), and in 1997 its Kyoto Protocol. The adoption of the Paris Climate 
Agreement in 2015 further solidified the central role of law in global climate mitigation, 
adaptation and resilience governance, while in that same year climate change emerged as one 
of 17 key development concerns of states through its explicit incorporation in the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) as SDG 13 and the targets set for SDGs 1 and 11.23 In tandem with 
and often spurred on by these developments on the international plane, some geographically 
clustered states have over the years developed regional climate change laws and policies 
specifically suited for their needs and circumstances. These range from highly developed 
normative frameworks such as in the European Union to more rhetorically ambitious but non-
committal and far less impactful policy statements and strategic guidelines such as in the 
African Union.24  
In the wake of these international and regional developments, perhaps more so than in any 
other environment-oriented regulatory domain, climate change policies and laws have been 
mushrooming in numerous countries around the world:25 ‘the volume of legislation, private 
standard setting, judicial decisions and legal scholarship has now become almost 
 
19  Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Co., Suit No. FHC/CS/B/153/2005 (hereinafter Gbemre). 
20  Mbabazi and Others v. The Attorney General and National Environmental Management Authority, Civil 
Suit No. 283 of 2012 (hereinafter Mbabazi). 
21  See, for example, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016) (hereinafter Juliana v. 
United States). 
22  Setzer & Vanhala, supra note 1 at 12.  
23  For a broader discussion of environmental and related climate matters and the SDGs, see Duncan French 
& Louis J. Kotzé eds., SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: LAW, THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION (2018). 
24  Daniel Pallangyo & Werner Scholtz, Africa and Climate Change: Legal Perspectives from the AU, in 
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: TRANSREGIONAL COMPARATIVE LESSONS IN PURSUIT OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (2015); Javier de Cendra de Larragán, EU Climate Change Law: A Credible Example?, in 
REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: TRANSREGIONAL COMPARATIVE LESSONS IN PURSUIT OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT (2015). 
25  Nachmany et al., supra note 16. 
 6 
overwhelming’.26 Collectively, this burgeoning transnational normative climate change 
framework has recognized new rights and created new private and public actor duties with 
respect to governing climate change within and beyond state borders. Where rights and duties 
are created, especially in a relatively novel juridical domain such as climate change, the 
resolution of legal disputes arising from the application of these laws and the enforcement of 
rights and duties emanating from them are sure to follow, including through litigation. 
Moreover, the complexity of climate change as a so-called ‘super wicked’ problem (i.e., a 
problem that ‘defies resolution because of the enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, 
circularities, and conflicting stakeholders implicated by any effort to develop a solution’),27 
including especially its myriad societal impacts, is set to give rise to a wide range of complex 
disputes, many that will ultimately have to be settled in courts: 
 
Climate change is inevitably the business of courts. Courts do many things: they uphold the rule 
of law, they interpret and apply the law, they resolve disputes, they attribute responsibility and 
determine liability, they hold decision makers to account, they ensure that laws and other forms of 
binding agreements are implemented and they delineate the boundaries of legitimate authority and 
lawful executive action. Climate change issues can be involved in all these tasks.28 
 
In an attempt to define it, Peel says climate change litigation seeks ‘redress for damage arising 
from human activities said to be causing global climate change’.29 We agree in part with such 
a characterization and would caution against broadening the scope of climate change 
litigation’s subject matter too much; i.e., one that would essentially embrace all damage arising 
directly or indirectly from all climate, and consequentially environment-related human 
activities. After all, if everything is climate change litigation, then nothing is, and this special 
litigation category then merely blends into the broader body of environmental litigation, of 
which it is an essential but autonomous part; an autonomy it should arguably retain if it were 
to continue riding the wave of interest, positive sentiments and enthusiasm currently 
surrounding it. We would suggest, however, that climate change litigation is not exclusively 
concerned only with redressing damage caused by climate change. Climate change litigation 
ideally should and often does address both the causes and consequences of climate change, 
thereby also providing the legal means, properly backed as these are by judicial authority, to 
deter actions and inaction that could lead to damage, as well as the legal means to force actors 
to avoid damage, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and to take measures to increase 
resilience and reduce vulnerability in the face of a changing climate. In a nutshell then, climate 
change litigation could simply be defined as all litigious means offered by judicial and quasi-
judicial fora to adjudicate juridical conflicts emanating directly from the risks and impacts of 
climate change. 
Such an expanded but nevertheless focused view of climate change litigation is further 
contextualized by the many types of conflicts that arise from climate change concerns and that 
are susceptible to litigation. These have to do with a range of motivations that also usefully 
intimate why climate change litigation has become increasingly popular. For example: a 
government could be forced through judicial means to address climate change where its 
policies, laws and actions are deemed non-existent or ineffective. Climate change litigation is 
 
26  Daniel A. Farber & Marjan Peeters, Introduction to Volume I, in CLIMATE CHANGE LAW: VOLUME I 1 
(2016). 
27  Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the 
Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).  
28  Elizabeth Fisher & Eloise Scotford, Climate Change Adjudication: The Need to Foster Legal Capacity: 
An Editorial Comment, 28 JEL 1, 3-4 (2016). 
29  Jacqueline Peel, The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Australia’s Response to Global Warming, 24 
EPLJ 90, 91 (2007). 
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increasingly considered a viable option in such instances to provoke regulatory change and to 
stimulate legislative action, and could be a temporary or longer-term alternative to delayed 
legislative or executive action.30 Where climate laws do exist, climate change litigation usually 
focusses on challenging the validity of these laws as well as their interpretation, application 
and enforcement.31 Through litigious means the public is afforded a legitimate political voice 
to confront what Stern calls aspirational ‘symbolic regulation’ that ‘lacks regulatory bite’,32 
while forcing legislators and policymakers through a process of judicial oversight to be more 
ambitious and thorough in their approaches to climate change, thus at once endeavoring to fill 
governance gaps. To this end, climate change litigation is seen as an important mechanism in 
what has been termed ‘climate change lawfare’, a phenomenon which refers to the ‘diverse 
strategies [including litigation] in which rights and legal institutions figure prominently, are 
adopted intentionally, and used strategically with the aim of helping deliver or at least catalyze 
social transformation and human development’ in the context of climate change.33 Importantly, 
all of the foregoing were underlying motivations for litigation in the three African cases, as we 
shall see below.  
Relatedly, consequent upon the failures of some governments to implement the international 
climate law regime, as well as their reluctance to develop domestic legal responses that act in 
tandem with this regime, various state and non-state actors are increasingly looking to the 
judiciary for solutions to address global climate change:34 
 
National legislatures bear the primary responsibility to give legal effect to the commitments 
undertaken by states under the Paris agreement. However, the courts will also have an important 
role in holding their governments to account, and, so far as possible within the constraints of their 
individual legal systems, in ensuring that those commitments are given practical and enforceable 
effect.35 
 
While the foregoing reflects on the crucial role courts play in upholding the rule of law, it also 
strongly resonates with the general idea of ‘glocalisation’,36 in terms of which the 
ineffectiveness of international climate law and governance is addressed at lower but no less 
important and potentially far more effective regulatory levels.37 As Aust and Du Plessis say, 
our trite understanding of top-down hierarchical global environmental governance is steadily 
being challenged, thus opening up regulatory spaces for the accommodation of local 
governance actors to address global climate change through powerful judicial means that are 
available to them and through which they could instigate regulatory change in a bottom-up 
 
30  David Browne, Causation and Damages in Climate Litigation: Evaluating the Role of Human Rights Law, 
6 IYIL 49, 51 (2011). 
31  UN Environment, THE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GLOBAL REVIEW 4 (2017). 
32  That is, when ‘vote-hungry legislators attempt to appease public demand for environmental protection by 
enacting weak legislation or passing sweeping mandates that shift responsibility to agencies’. Stephanie 
M. Stern, State Action as Political Voice in Climate Change Policy: A Case Study of the Minnesota 
Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 39 et seq (2009). 
33  Siri Gloppen & Asuncion Lera St. Claire, Climate Change Lawfare, 79 SOCIAL RESEARCH 899, 907 (2012). 
34  Burns and Osofsky, supra note 1, at 20. 
35  Lord Carnwath JSC, Climate Change Adjudication After Paris: A Reflection, 28 JEL 5, 9 (2016). 
36  See, for example, Zygmunt Bauman, On Glocalization: Or Globalization for Some, Localization for 
Others, 54 THESIS ELEVEN 37 (1998). 
37  See Katherine Trisolini & Jonathan Zasloff, Cities, Land Use, and the Global Commons: Genesis and the 
Urban Politics of Climate Change, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND 
INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 72-98 (2009). 
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way.38 At the same time, being part of the trias politica, courts are often well placed to remind 
the other two branches of government (i.e., the executive and legislative authorities) of their 
international climate law obligations, and/or to directly incorporate international climate, 
environmental and human rights law obligations into domestic legal systems when they 
adjudicate climate change conflicts. The courts in both Thabametsi and Gbemre have followed 
such an international law-friendly approach, as we shall see below. 
In addition to formally providing non-governmental actors the opportunity to have a say in, 
and hopefully to meaningfully impact on, climate change governance in a country, climate 
change litigation also fulfils a valuable informal socio-legal role, notably to the extent that 
courts provide an independent, non-political public forum to voice concerns and to have claims 
heard and determined;39 an important consideration given the highly politicized nature of 
climate change. To this end Osofsky says climate change litigation also 
 
... provides a mechanism for dialogue and awareness, in addition to a more formal forcing or 
limiting role, in a regulatory environment in which policies have not caught up with the problem. 
At least as important, it creates diagonal interactions through which different levels and branches 
of regulators interact and grapple with what is needed. These cases help to bring attention to 
regulatory options and debates, and push policymakers to address more nuances of the problem in 
the process.40 
 
This might be a particularly critical concern in some African countries where limited 
possibilities and potential exist for active and inclusive civil society participation and 
representation in and influence on government-dominated climate governance processes.41 The 
courts are often the only available institutional means through which civil society is able to 
influence climate change governance. Unsurprisingly, then, in all three cases we analyze 
below, the applicants have been concerned civil society actors (also acting on behalf of others 
unable to represent themselves). 
Climate change litigation could take many forms depending, among others, on the type of 
legal system where it occurs, on the nature of the particular conflict, on the parties involved, 
and on whether it is a federal or a unitary state where the case is heard. For example, in federal 
states such as the United States, litigation encompasses federal statutory and constitutional 
claims as well as state law claims and usually consists of common law tortious actions, where 
claimants sue on the basis of negligence or nuisance. Such actions often extend beyond private 
persons inter partes to the state, where it is argued that the state has written or unwritten duties 
to protect its citizens. In other instances, litigation could be based on environmental 
administrative/procedural law actions focusing on environmental impact assessments (EIAs), 
permitting or planning laws.42  
More recently, however, climate change and litigation have become central concerns in the 
human rights paradigm. The United Nations Human Rights Council recognized in 2008 that 
 
38  Helmut Aust & Anél du Plessis, Good Urban Governance as a Global Aspiration: On the Potential and 
Limits of Sustainable Development Goal 11, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS: LAW, THEORY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 208 (2018). 
39  Brian J. Preston, The Contribution of the Courts in Tackling Climate Change, 28 JEL 11, 12 (2016). 
40  Hari Osofsky, Conclusion: Adjudicating Climate Change Across Scales, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE 
CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 383 (2009). 
41  Jean-Claude Ashukem, A RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO FOREIGN AGRO-INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE IN 
CAMEROON, UGANDA AND SOUTH AFRICA (2016) (LLD thesis, North-West University); Caiphas 
Brewsters Soyapi, THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ADVANCING THE RIGHT TO A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT: 
EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES (2018) (LLD thesis, North-West University). 
42  An approach followed to a significant extent in Australia in the context of EIA approvals for new coal 
mines. See Lesley McAllister, Litigating Climate Change at the Coal Mine, in CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, 
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 48-71 (2009). 
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‘climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around 
the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights’.43 It is therefore no 
surprise that in some parts of the world, notably in countries of the Global South, where courts 
often directly rely on bills of rights, climate change litigation frequently involves a rights-based 
approach and manifests as constitutional claims.44 Human rights are also a central feature in 
the three African cases we analyze below. While human rights law usually remains aspirational 
with little immediate effect, and while most human rights obligations apply to states and not to 
the non-state corporations that are major contributors to climate change,45 a rights-based 
approach is increasingly seen as holding out several benefits, especially to the extent that 
climate change litigation that is framed in the language of rights ‘could offer minimum rights 
thresholds and strengthen the adaptive and preventative mechanisms available, particularly for 
those who are more vulnerable and marginalised’.46 Human rights also have the ability to 
‘invoke a sense of profundity and moral weight that comports with the enormity and gravity of 
the climate change problem’.47  
As a matter of corrective justice, climate change litigation could be used to act against a 
government where it allows carbon-intensive developments such as the proliferation of coal-
fired power stations that could cause harm. Private industry actors such as energy and 
petroleum companies could also be taken to task for their climate-damaging activities, and 
there has been a steep rise in climate change litigation against corporations, as a recent report 
indicates: ‘[C]limate litigation targeting fossil fuel companies is a growing trend and it is likely 
to remain as one as more groups see it as a tool to prompt shifts among the companies that have 
managed to avoid their share of responsibility for the accelerated impacts of climate change.’48 
Both of these approaches were evident in Thabametsi and Gbemre.  
Although not at issues in our three cases, it is also possible that private citizens could litigate 
against one another where one or the other does not adhere to climate-related legal obligations 
in a classic neighbor, property, delictual or tort law set-up. Staying with the private law sphere, 
the far-reaching present and future potential impacts of climate change on the insurance 
industry (an industry particularly familiar to litigation) already foreshadow the potential for a 
rise in insurance claims and the associated judicial conflict resolution.49 
Litigating on the back of the property rights-based public trust doctrine in climate cases is 
also an emerging trend in terms of which claimants are able to argue that certain natural 
resources belong to the public and should as such be protected by the state against the impacts 
of climate change.50 Atmospheric or climate trust litigation, as it is categorized in the United 
States, departs from the premise that all governments hold the climate as a public resource in 
trust for their citizens and they bear the fiduciary obligation to protect it for present and future 
generations. Where they do not, they could be forced to do so through litigious means and the 
authority of the courts; with the courts well positioned in the light of the trias politica doctrine 
 
43  UNHRC, Resolution 7/23: Human Rights and Climate Change (2008), 
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_23.pdf. 
44  Notably Ashgar Leghari, supra note 5. See Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in Climate 
Change Litigation?, 7 TEL 1 (2017). 
45  Marilyn Averill, Linking Climate Litigation and Human Rights, 18 RECIEL 139, 141 (2009). 
46  Browne, supra note 30, at 49. 
47  Amy Sinden, An Emerging Human Right to Security from Climate Change: The Case Against Gas Flaring 
in Nigeria, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 
174 (2009). 
48  For a recent survey see Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, TURNING UP THE HEAT: CORPORATE 
LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2018). 
49  Jeffrey Stempel, Insurance and Climate Change Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, 
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 230-51 (2009). 
50  Anél du Plessis, Climate Change, Public Trusteeship and Tomorrows of the Unborn, 31 SAJHR 269 
(2015). 
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and their powers of judicial oversight ‘to define these duties by tying them directly to scientists’ 
concrete prescription for carbon reduction’.51 The Mbabazi case we discuss below is likely to 
be based largely on this climate trust litigation approach, and it might very well closely 
resemble the ongoing Juliana case in the United States noted earlier.  
The foregoing mostly reflects on the positive attributes and advantages of climate change 
litigation. While dealt with in far greater detail in other texts,52 because these are also present 
to a greater or lesser extent in the three African cases, it is worth noting here in brief some of 
the drawbacks and difficulties associated with climate change litigation. Browne53 points out 
that because of climate change’s multi-faceted and diffused multi-scalar impacts, identifying 
appropriate plaintiffs and defendants and a proper judicial forum could be a complicated 
matter. So too is the fact that climate change damage is realized over very different time and 
spatial scales, rendering it an inter-generational concern that is unrestricted by geographical 
borders as well. With specific reference to the issue of time and the temporalities of 
environmental (and climate) law, Richardson indicates that: 
 
The law can be too temporally one-dimensional, and indeed quite static, lacking the adaptive 
flexibility to adjust to new circumstances and unwilling to acknowledge past losses. Mired in 
an overly contemporaneous time frame preoccupied with the present, environmental law has 
struggled to recognize the frequently slow and temporally dispersed harms inflicted on nature. 
Insidious threats such as climate change, which gradually unleash mayhem rather than 
spectacularly erupting to jolt our complacency, are perpetuated with minimal (if any) legal 
sanctions.54 
Relatedly, establishing proximate causation is a significant hurdle in the face of scientific 
uncertainty, as well as allocating culpability to actors for historic or non-point contributions to 
climate change.55  Finally, in countries with restrictive locus standi and other procedural 
provisions, it might be difficult for claimants to gain access to courts or access to critical 
information.56 We highlight throughout the discussion below some of these challenges where 
they are apparent in the three African cases.  
 
 
3 Litigable climate change conflicts in Africa 
 
The context within which litigable climate change conflicts arise in Africa is multifaceted, with 
several of the issues usually associated with climate conflicts being particularly pronounced in 
the African context. As a point of departure, this context revolves on key risks that climate 
change poses to Africa and its people, notably as determined by the Intergovernmental Panel 
 
51  Mary Christina Wood, Atmospheric Trust Litigation, in ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, 
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 109-10 (2009). 
52  For example, in William Burns & Hari Osofsky eds., ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, 
NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES (2009). 
53  Browne, supra note 30, at 52-5. 
54  Benjamin Richardson, Doing Time: The Temporalities of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE 56 (2017). 
55  Hari Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in Massachusetts v. EPA, in CLIMATE CHANGE: 
STATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 129-44 (2009). 
56  See Giulio Corsi, A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Governance: The New Wave of Climate Change 
Litigation (October 2017), http://www.iccgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/57_Climate-change-
litigation_Giulio-Corsi.pdf. 
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on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Fifth Assessment Report.57 The risks include: shifts in biome 
distribution; compounded stress on water resources; degradation of ocean ecosystems; reduced 
crop productivity and increased food insecurity; adverse effects on livestock and impacts on 
rural communities; changes in the incidence and geographic range of vector- and water-borne 
diseases; undernutrition; increased in-country and cross-border migration; sea level rise; and 
extreme weather events. We explore below the types of litigable conflicts that might arise 
within this continental climate change risk and vulnerability profile. 
Several African countries are carbon resource rich (notably Angola, South Africa and 
Nigeria) and still predominantly rely on relatively cheap but dirty and carbon-intensive 
resources for energy production, especially coal and oil, which are major contributors to 
climate change. African governments and energy corporations are determined to exploit these 
resources in the name of economic progress, and/or allowing these resources to be exploited 
by foreign governments and multinational corporations in exchange for money and other 
incentives.58 This is an unsettling reality evidenced by Africa’s continued (almost sole) 
dependence upon the same narrow range of commodity exports while it contributes to 
providing some of the world’s carbon-rich resources that cause climate change;59 a 
consideration that suggests Africa plays a critical role in the global carbon cycle. The continued 
use of fossil fuels to drive unsustainable socio-economic development is likely to give rise to 
future and aggravate existing climate-related conflicts in African countries, including conflicts 
associated with broader environmental destruction and impacts on the health and well-being of 
vulnerable people. As a case in point, although it has not been explicitly classified as a climate 
change dispute, the devastation occasioned by carbon-related oil extraction practices has 
already been exposed by the ACommHPR in the SERAC Communication mentioned above, 
and they are glaringly evident in the Gbemre case we discuss below.60 
Intimately coupled with the foregoing is the clear trend in Africa’s most industrialized 
nations, especially in South Africa and Nigeria, to ensure energy security by means of an almost 
exclusive reliance on carbon-intensive fossil fuel resources, notably coal. While there are some 
tentative efforts to expand the renewable energy sector, especially in South Africa through 
solar power projects, the abundant availability of cheap coal remains a significant consideration 
in and a key driver of energy security promotion policies and the development of power 
generation infrastructure.61 Despite scientific evidence confirming the devastating climate 
impacts of fossil fuel-based power generation, especially in developing countries that are often 
unable to implement the best available but often prohibitively expensive power generation 
technologies with the least climate impacts, African governments, like other governments in 
the Global South, generally seem to be taking a decidedly short-term view, as evidenced by 
their enthusiastic support of expanding the fossil fuel-based energy sector across the 
continent.62 As a case in point, the South African government’s unequivocal support for the 
 
57  Isabelle Niang et al., Africa, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. 
PART B: REGIONAL ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1237-8 (2014). 
58  Patrick Bond, LOOTING AFRICA: THE ECONOMICS OF EXPLOITATION (2007). 
59  It is estimated that ‘African carbon dynamics are of global significance. The continent’s vast carbon stocks 
seem to be highly vulnerable to climate change, evidenced by strong sensitivity of net ecosystem 
productivity and fire emissions to climate fluctuations’. Christopher A. Williams et al., Africa and the 
Global Carbon Cycle, 2 CARBON BALANCE MANAG. 1, 10 (2007). 
60  ACHPR 155/96, supra note 9. 
61  Anna Pegels, Renewable Energy in South Africa: Potentials, Barriers and Options for Support, 38 ENERGY 
POLICY 4945 (2010). 
62  See for an overview, Jamed Dorian, Herman Franssen & Dale Simbeck, Global Challenges in Energy, 34 
ENERGY POLICY 1984 (2006). 
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construction of a coal-fired power station, despite damning evidence of its predicted climate 
and broader environmental impacts, was at the heart of the Thabametsi dispute. 
The growing phenomenon of land-grabbing (a result of the convergence between the global 
food, energy, financial and climate crisis),63 is another related concern, where Africans are 
dispossessed of their land for the sake of expanding climate change-related activities by foreign 
countries and multinational corporations on the continent.64 The cultivation especially of 
biofuels (including on dispossessed land) is a pertinent concern in this respect, which is also a 
result of the governments of Northern countries being forced (ironically through their 
obligations emanating from the prevailing international climate law regime) to diversify their 
energy mix away from dirty carbon resources.65 By expanding the agricultural sector, which 
also significantly contributes to global carbon emissions, Northern governments and powerful 
corporations are aggravating climate change globally and environmental destruction in 
Southern countries, while relocating responsibility for their actions, and the associated conflicts 
that might arise from these actions, to a continent far removed from their own back yards.66 
This is especially worrying if one considers that the large-scale use of bio-energy is threatening 
food security in Africa because productive lands for sustainable food production are used to 
produce biofuels that are exported to the North.67 Another concern is the deliberate 
displacement (and often killing) of people living in areas that are rich in fossil fuels and that 
governments and petroleum corporations aim to develop. In the SERAC Communication, for 
example, it was alleged that the Nigerian Government-Shell Petroleum Consortium (the same 
entity that was also the respondent in the Gbemre case), ‘has exploited oil reserves in 
Ogoniland with no regard for the health or environment of the local communities, disposing 
toxic wastes into the environment and local waterways in violation of applicable international 
environmental standards’; and more worryingly, that ‘Nigerian security forces have attacked, 
burned and destroyed several Ogoni villages and homes’ in the oil rich area while ‘unarmed 
villagers running from the troops were shot from behind’.68 Such practices especially impact 
ethnic minorities, indigenous people and other vulnerable groups such as women and children. 
They are closely dependent on natural resources and will probably suffer most from the impacts 
of climate change as well as the exploitative practices occasioned by exploitative government 
and corporate practices, including those practices related to agriculture, land-grabbing and 
forced removals.69 Litigable climate conflicts might very well arise in the foregoing context 
between, for example, dispossessed landowners, farmers, governments and corporations.  
While not a consideration in any of the three African cases we investigate below, apart from 
their involvement in carbon resource activities and biofuels, but related to these, corporations 
and foreign governments might increasingly capitalize on Africa’s disposition to act as a trash 
can for their harmful environmental waste in return for financial remuneration as a quid pro 
quo. The infamous 2006 Trafigura incident, where a ship chartered by the Singaporean-based 
 
63  Saturnino Borras et al., Towards a Better Understanding of Global Land Grabbing: An Editorial 
Introduction, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 209, 209 (2011). 
64  Ruth Hall, Land Grabbing in Southern Africa: The Many Faces of the Investor Rush, 38 ROAPE 193 
(2011). See for a list of foreign private and government investors in developing countries, IFPRI, ‘Land 
Grabbing’ by Foreign Investors in Developing Countries: Risks and Opportunities (2009), 
http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/landgrab/landgrabifpritab01.pdf. 
65  Yi Yang, Junghan Bae, Junbeum Kim & Sangwon Suh, Replacing Gasoline with Corn Ethanol Results in 
Significant Environmental Problem-shifting, 46 ENVIRON. SCI. TECHNOL. 3671 (2012); Ashlie Delshad, 
Leigh Raymond, Vanessa Sawicki & Duane Wegener, Public Attitudes Toward Political and 
Technological Options for Biofuels, 38 ENERGY POLICY 3414 (2010). 
66  Ashukem, supra note 41. 
67  Jonathan Verschuuren, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Agriculture and Food Security, 7 EJRR 
54, 55 (2016). 
68  ACHPR 155/96, supra note 9, at paras 2, 7 and 8. 
69  Browne, supra note 30, at 50-1. 
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oil and commodity shipping company Trafigura Beheer BV offloaded toxic waste in the Ivory 
Coast’s city of Abidjan against payment to a local waste handling company, is a suggestive 
case in point.70 The incident, during which several people died as a result of exposure to the 
toxic waste and thousands of others were seriously injured, foreshadows the severity, depth 
and complexity of similar litigable conflicts that might arise in the climate change context. This 
might happen, for example, where a government that is intent on moving away from coal-fired 
power plants increases its corporate owned and operated nuclear power facilities but disposes 
of its nuclear waste in an African country in such a way as to harm that country’s population 
and environment. The potential litigable conflicts that might arise in this immensely complex 
web of transnational actors and movements, numerous overlapping jurisdictions, and 
intersecting juridical domains ranging from international, to corporate, human rights, 
environmental and climate laws is significant. 
Many populations, especially rural people in Africa, are not resilient and able to effectively 
adapt to and/or to withstand erratic climatic and environmental conditions and disruptions as a 
result of climate change.71 In the face of increased and highly unpredictable floods in some 
parts of the continent, severe droughts in others, and increased incidences of climate-related 
diseases that threaten livestock and human health and well-being, there is a real possibility of 
litigable conflicts arising between people (and countries) over dwindling resources.72 
Predominantly nestled in and emerging from the human rights paradigm, such conflicts can 
also arise between people and their governments, notably where governments are 
constitutionally and/or statutorily obliged to provide food, water and shelter to people, but 
refrain from doing so. As we show below, all of these are considerations that were present in 
the Mbabazi case. The devastating drought in Cape Town in 2017-2018 is another example, 
and it is possible that conflicts over the constitutionally entrenched rights of access to sufficient 
water and adequate housing that have already been litigated in the South African Constitutional 
Court,73 might flare up again and find their way back to court in future. So too is the very real 
possibility of ethnic conflicts that might arise as a result of climate-induced migration and 
competition for food, water, shelter and other scarce socio-economic opportunities.74 Drawing 
again from the South African example, while they have only been indirectly attributed to 
climate change impacts, the recent and continuously simmering xenophobic attacks across the 
country aimed specifically at non-South African immigrants, and the related ongoing municipal 
service delivery protests occurring across the country, suggest a possible escalation in litigable 
conflicts as a result of increased competition among expanding populations (also as a result of 
climate-induced migration and internal displacement) over dwindling socio-economic 
resources that are quantitatively and qualitatively being impacted upon by climate change.75 
In a nutshell, while broadly mirroring climate conflicts that arise elsewhere in the world, the 
foregoing discussion suggests that the nature and types of litigable climate conflicts that could 
 
70  See, among others, Liesbeth F. H. Enneking, The Common Denominator of the Trafigura Case, Foreign 
Direct Liability Cases and the Rome II Regulation: An Essay on the Consequences of Private International 
Law for the Feasibility of Regulating Multinational Corporations through Tort Law, 16 EUR. REV. PRIV. 
LAW 283 (2008). 
71  Niang et al., supra note 57, at 1199-265. 
72  Gwynne Dyer, CLIMATE WARS (2008). 
73  Sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Mazibuko and Others v City 
of Johannesburg and Others (CCT 39/09) [2009] ZACC 28 (8 October 2009) and Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (CCT11/00) [2000] ZACC 19 (4 October 
2000). For a discussion, see Kotzé & du Plessis, supra note 11. 
74  Oksana Yakushko, Xenophobia; Understanding the Roots and Consequences of Negative Attitudes Toward 
Immigrants, 37 COUNS. PSYCHOL. 36 (2009). 
75  Caiphas Soyapi and Louis J. Kotzé, Environmental Racism, Slow Violence and the Extractive Industry in 
Post-apartheid South Africa: Marikana in Context, 49 VRU 393 (2016). 
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arise in Africa are also unique to a developing country context, especially in the sense that they 
are closely intertwined with concerns arising from the ‘environmentalism of the poor’ 
paradigm;76 a paradigm that centers on social justice, survival, the preservation of livelihoods 
and indigenous worldviews, including claims to recognition and participation that build on the 
premise that ‘the fights for human rights and environment are inseparable ... The 
environmentalism of the poor relates to actions and concerns in situations where the 
environment is a source of livelihood’.77 To this end, litigable climate conflicts in Africa might 
very well go beyond typical concerns prevalent in developed countries. As a result of the 
continent’s unique attributes and socio-economic and environmental conditions, conflicts 
might mostly emanate from potentially existential issues of survival where basic conditions of 
human welfare are affected by climate change and the associated (in)actions of governments 
and corporations. We suggest that this in itself might render climate change litigation in Africa 
a thoroughly complex matter. 
 
 
4 Country analysis 
 
It has already been suggested above that the African Union substantially lags behind its 
regional counterparts as far as developing and enforcing a comprehensive and effective 
regional climate law and governance framework is concerned. The bulk of the law and policy 
initiatives in this respect focus on efforts to strengthen Africa’s representation and influence at 
global climate negotiation summits, notably through the adoption by the African Union 
Summit in 2009 of the Nairobi Declaration on the African Process for Combatting Climate 
Change, which promoted a common African position on and highlighted continent-wide 
concerns about the impacts of climate change.78 In 2014, the African Union adopted its Strategy 
on Climate Change, which is meant to serve as ‘strategic guidance’ to enable African countries 
to ‘effectively address climate change challenges’.79 This non-binding strategy notes that 
climate change ‘could lead to insecurity and conflicts undermining peace in Africa’,80 a tacit 
acknowledgement perhaps of the need to create appropriate institutions and processes to deal 
with such conflicts, if not through the courts, then through other means and institutions. 
Also at a sub-regional level, in terms of instruments such as the Southern African Sub-
Regional Framework of Climate Change Programmes of 201081 and the East African 
Community Climate Change Policy of 2010,82 it cannot be said that African countries derive 
any regionally binding obligations to take concrete measures to reduce greenhouse gasses, or 
to develop and adopt appropriate climate change policies and laws, or to cater for aspects of 
climate governance, including the resolution of climate disputes through litigation in their 
domestic law and governance systems. These non-binding frameworks at most serve as 
suggestive roadmaps for the domestic development of climate policies, laws and institutions, 
and much of what is happening domestically is on the back of African states’ own initiatives 
 
76  Rob Nixon, SLOW VIOLENCE AND THE ENVIRONMENTALISM OF THE POOR (2011). 
77  Joan Martinez-Alier, The Environmentalism of the Poor, 54 GEOFORUM 239, 240 (2014). 
78  See further Lesley Masters, Sustaining the African Common Position on Climate Change: International 
Organisations, Africa and COP17, 18 S. AFR. J. INT. AFF. 257 (2011). 
79  African Union, Draft African Union Strategy on Climate Change 3 (2014), 
http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/cap_draft_auclimatestrategy_2015.pdf. 
80  Id. at 55. 
81  SADC, Southern Africa Sub-Regional Framework of Climate Change Programmes (2010), 
http://www.sadc.int/files/4813/5293/3518/Southern_Africa_Framework_of_Subregional_Climate_Chang
e_Programmes.pdf. 
82  East African Community, EAC Climate Change Policy (2010), 
http://www.bnbadvocates.com/publications/Climate_change_law/CCL00002.pdf. 
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and in the light of the international law framework or domestic constitutional, administrative 
and environmental law. To this end, South Africa, Uganda and Nigeria are signatories to the 
Paris Climate Agreement, which has been ratified and has entered into force in all three 
countries. While these countries have elaborate constitutional and environmental law 
provisions, only South Africa and Nigeria have climate change policies. With South Africa 
expected to adopt its first framework climate change statute only in the course of 2019,83 none 
has a specific designated climate change act yet. The climate disputes that have been litigated 
accordingly arose from within their non-binding climate policy frameworks and the more 
general constitutional, environmental and procedural law regimes, as we shall see below. 
 
4.1 South Africa 
While Africa’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions remains comparatively 
negligible, South Africa is an exception. As Africa’s most developed economy and 
industrialized nation, it has one of the highest greenhouse gas contributions among developing 
countries worldwide.84 Despite its level of economic development and relatively strong 
industrial performance, high poverty levels and weak socio-economic systems in several urban 
and rural areas threaten the resilience and adaptive capacity of many people.85 The country 
boasts an advanced constitutional and environmental law regime; it is a constitutional 
democracy with its courts playing an active role in upholding the rule of law, including in 
environmental matters. Section 24 of its constitution provides for a right to a healthy 
environment, which is the center-piece of the country’s environmental governance effort.86 
While it has a comprehensive environmental governance framework statute in the form of the 
National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) that provides for elaborate 
EIA procedures and the notion of public trusteeship as well as numerous sectoral 
environmental laws that operate under the NEMA framework,87 to date it has only issued a 
consolidated climate change policy, i.e., the National Climate Change Response White Paper 
of 2011 (Climate Change White Paper),88 and more recently the Climate Change Bill of 2018. 
The Climate Change White Paper is an ambitious policy vision for climate mitigation and 
adaptation, but while it envisages legislative innovation, Kidd and Couzens warn that ‘its 
effectiveness looks likely to be undermined by simultaneous policy development in other 
branches of government confirming [their] continued commitment to fossil-fuel [sic] based 
sources of energy and indeed increased generation of energy from fossil fuels’.89 For its part, 
 
83  Department of Environmental Affairs, Climate Change Bill (Government Notice 580 in Government 
Gazette No. 41689 of 2018) (hereinafter Climate Change Bill). 
84  See USAID, Greenhouse Gas Emissions in South Africa (2012), 
https://www.climatelinks.org/sites/default/files/asset/document/GHG%20Emissions%20Fact%20Sheet%
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85  Anél du Plessis, South Africa’s Constitutional Environmental Rights Generously Interpreted: What is in it 
for Poverty?, 27 SAJHR 279 (2011). 
86  Section 24 reads: ‘Everyone has the right – (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures that – (i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) 
promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development’. 
87  For a comprehensive discussion see Jan Glazewski, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA (3d ed. 
2013).  
88  Department of Environmental Affairs, National Climate Change Response White Paper (2012), 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitep
aper.pdf. See Tracy Humby et al. eds., CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
(2016). 
89  Michael Kidd & Ed Couzens, Climate Change Responses in South Africa, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 
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the objectives of the Climate Change Bill include, amongst others, to provide for the effective 
management of inevitable climate change impacts through enhancing the country’s adaptive 
capacity, strengthening its resilience and reducing its vulnerability to climate change, with a 
view to building social, economic and environmental resilience and an adequate national 
adaptation response in the context of the global climate change response.90 To this end, the Bill 
includes principles, measures for law and policy alignment, numerous institutional 
arrangements, climate change response duties at subnational level, national adaptation 
measures, and greenhouse gas emission and removal provisions that could all become relevant 
in litigable climate conflicts that might arise in the country. While the details of these 
provisions are expected to change in the process of finalizing the Bill, once adopted as law by 
Parliament, it might potentially have a significant influence on future climate change litigation 
in South Africa. 
Returning to the present, hailed as South Africa’s first and still only climate case, judgment 
was delivered in Thabametsi by the Pretoria High Court on 8 March 2017 in a lengthy, highly 
detailed, comprehensively reasoned, and at times complex and technical decision.91 At the 
heart of the dispute were various potential environmental and climate impacts that would result 
from government’s decision to build a 1,200 MW coal-fired power station in the water scarce 
and ecologically sensitive northern parts of the country. Not part of the scandal-ridden national 
energy provider Eskom, which has been implicated in systemic corruption under the previous 
Zuma administration,92 the power station would be funded and operated by an independent 
power producer (IPP). The Minister of Environmental Affairs, the Chief Director of the 
national environmental authority and the IPP acted as respondents. The applicant, Earthlife 
Africa (ELA), is an influential environmental NGO that also successfully managed in 2005 to 
challenge government’s decision in another energy-related matter; to build a pebble bed 
modular nuclear reactor close to Cape Town.93 In the present case, ELA believed that coal-
fired power stations were ‘an inappropriate means to generate electricity since other forms of 
power generation are more sustainable and less damaging to the environment ... [and ELA] is 
motivated by a vision that all coal-fired power stations should not be permitted because they 
contribute to CO2 emissions globally’.94 
Prior to the construction of a coal-fired power station, a developer must obtain from the 
environmental authority, among others, an authorization that is issued only after consideration 
of an elaborate EIA in terms of the NEMA and its EIA Regulations.95 Currently, the EIA 
Regulations do not require in any explicit terms that a climate change impact assessment 
(CCIA) be conducted, or that climate change be considered as part of the general EIA process. 
Consequent upon its approval of the EIA report, which allegedly ‘failed to address the climate 
change impacts of the proposed coal-fired power station in any detail’, and which stated that 
the ‘climate change impacts are expected to be relatively small and low’,96 the environmental 
authority granted the authorization in March 2015. Focusing primarily on administrative and 
procedural considerations, in May of that year, ELA lodged an appeal with the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs to set aside the decision to grant the authorization. Its appeal rested, 
among other issues, on the assertion that EIAs for coal-fired power stations must ‘as a matter 
 
90  Section 2(b) of the Bill. 
91  Also see Humby, supra note 7. 
92  Philippe Alfroy, Eskom: The Power Giant at the Core of South Africa’s State Rot, The Citizen, February 
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93  Earthlife Africa (Cape Town) v Director General Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and 
Another (7653/03) [2005] ZAWCHC 7 (26 January 2005).  
94  Thabametsi, supra note 18, at para. 23. 
95  Department of Environmental Affairs, Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations 2014 (Government 
Notice R982 in Government Gazette 38282 of 4 December 2014) (hereinafter EIA Regulations).  
96  Thabametsi, supra note 18, at para. 42.  
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of policy’ include ‘climate change considerations in full’.97 The Minister refused to set aside 
the authorization following her consideration of the appeal, but she accepted that ‘a climate 
change assessment was a relevant factor in deciding whether to grant the authorization’ and 
that the environmental authority ‘was required to take into account the GHG emissions and 
climate change impacts of the project’.98 She accordingly amended the authorization by 
inserting a condition that a CCIA must be undertaken prior to the commencement of the project, 
but she did not make the authorization conditional on the CCIA’s being conducted. The 
Minister believed a CCIA was merely a useful tool to collect data to use in the formulation of 
future policy and mitigation measures, to assess and monitor the climate change impact of the 
Thabametsi power station, and to determine whether and when it might be necessary to amend 
or supplement the conditions in the power station’s environmental authorization.99 In January 
2017 the CCIA was concluded and published for public comment. The assessment determined 
in no uncertain terms that the power station would generate over 8,2 million tons of carbon 
dioxide per year and over 246 million tons of carbon dioxide over its lifetime; emissions that 
it characterized as ‘very large by international standards’.100 It further highlighted several 
technological limitations in the design of the power station and that it would not be able to 
make use of carbon capture and storage.101 
Contending that it was ‘unlawful, irrational and unreasonable’ for the environmental 
authority and the Minister to have granted the environmental authorization in the absence of a 
proper CCIA in the first place,102 ELA launched judicial review proceedings against both the 
environmental authority’s initial authorization decision and the Minister’s appeal decision. The 
High Court upheld the judicial review claim, stating that without a full assessment of the 
climate change impact of the project there was ‘no rational basis for the environmental 
authority to endorse the baseless assertions’ that were made when the authorization was 
approved, which is an indication that the Chief-Director ‘failed to apply his mind’.103 As far as 
the Minister’s decision was concerned, the Court believed that she correctly found that a CCIA 
needed to be conducted, but that she erred in upholding the environmental authorization and 
not referring it back to the environmental authority for reconsideration.104 The Court 
nevertheless held that a more proportional remedy would not be a potentially far-reaching one 
that set aside the initial authorization, but rather a less intrusive one that ordered the Minister 
to constitute the appeal process afresh, during which process new information emerging from 
the CCIA had also to be considered.105  
On 30 January 2018 the Minister published her reconsideration of the appeal, noting at the 
outset her ‘dissatisfaction with the [Thabametsi] judgment’.106 Having considered, among 
other matters, the final CCIA and comments received from interested and affected parties on 
this assessment, the High Court’s judgment, and guidance issued by an environmental 
consultancy, she issued an order confirming the original environmental authorization that had 
been issued to the power station. In justifying her decision, she noted that the operation of the 
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106  Minister of Environmental Affairs, Reconsideration of the Appeal Against the Environmental 
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and Associated Infrastructure Near Lephalale, within the Jurisdiction of the Waterberg District 
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power station would result in ‘significant GHG emissions and [would] therefore have climate 
change impacts’,107 but that numerous mitigation measures had been put in place. The 
‘significant risk relating to GHG emissions could be very high’; ‘water scarcity risks [were] 
very high’; and the high risk of GHG emissions ‘implie[d] a high social cost’.108 Collectively 
viewed, however, she believed this did ‘not necessarily represent a fatal flaw, provided that the 
benefits [were] justified and [could] be motivated.’109 Disregarding any constitutional 
environmental injunctions and climate and environmental policies and laws, she instead 
justified these potential benefits by drawing solely on South Africa’s Integrated Resource Plan 
for Electricity 2010-2030 (IRP), a non-binding ‘planning tool’,110 as she says herself, a strategic 
policy guideline document for the promotion of energy security, which she noted ‘does not 
prohibit the establishment of new coal-fired power stations’, but rather ‘permits that 6,3 GW 
of new generation capacity may be derived from coal’.111 She emphasized in her decision that 
the overall thrust of the IRP is one supporting the view that the ‘harms that would result from 
the establishment of new coal-fired facilities ... were outweighed by the benefit to the country 
of having the additional energy generation capacity’.112 
What this means in effect is that the Minister, in complying with the rule of law, obeyed the 
Court’s order and gave effect to it by constituting the appeal process afresh. But by merely 
relying on an energy-focused policy to justify her decision on appeal, and by disregarding any 
climate, environmental or human rights laws, she simply endorsed the status quo by confirming 
the validity of the environmental authorization that had been issued in the first place and that 
would allow construction of the power station to commence subject to the original conditions. 
While the Minister recognized the importance of conducting a CCIA, she rendered its potential 
impact on the outcome of her decision nugatory. This outcome confirms Kidd and Couzens’ 
fears above: it seems that if the national environmental authority of South Africa has its way, 
the promotion of socio-economic development in the country will prevail, even in the face of 
severe climate change threats that have been independently confirmed by means of a CCIA. 
Clearly, this is a worrying state of affairs from a climate protection point of view that is likely 
to augment pressure on civil society and the courts in their efforts to ensure government 
properly considers not only economic but also social and ecological issues and interests when 
it makes decisions related to promoting energy security that may have severe climate-related 
impacts. 
In a letter dated 7 February 2018, lawyers from the Centre for Environmental Rights (CER), 
a group of activist environmental lawyers litigating environmental justice issues and acting on 
behalf of ELA, informed the Minister that they considered her decision ‘unlawful’ and that 
they intended instituting review proceedings against her decision in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).113 At the time of writing, these review 
proceedings have not yet commenced. CER specifically avers that the manner in which the 
Minister came to her decision by relying only on energy policies is contentious, and it could 
be argued that she disregarded the Court’s finding in Thabametsi that ‘[p]olicy instruments 
developed by the Department of Energy cannot alter the requirements of environmental 
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legislation for relevant climate change factors to be considered’.114 CER further notes that even 
if the sole reliance of an environmental protection authority on the energy promotion policy 
could somehow be justified, nothing in the Minister’s decision suggests that she has considered 
the fact that Eskom is currently delivering excess electricity capacity and does in fact not need 
a new power station.115 
Although the stage has clearly been set for a future climate change litigation battle in court, 
this outcome could arguably have been avoided had the Court granted ELA’s request to set 
aside the authorization and to have it remitted to the environmental authority for 
reconsideration. It is empowered by PAJA to do so, as it acknowledged itself,116 by virtue of 
section 8 of the Act which states: 
 
8. (1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review ... may grant any order that is just 
and equitable, including orders—  
(a) directing the administrator—  
(i) to give reasons; or  
(ii) to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires;  
(b) prohibiting the administrator from acting in a particular manner;  
(c) setting aside the administrative action and—  
(i) remitting the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, with or without directions; or  
(ii) in exceptional cases—  
(aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or correcting a defect resulting from the 
administrative action; or  
(bb) directing the administrator or any other party to the proceedings to pay compensation.117 
 
Such an order would have required the environmental authorization process to commence 
anew, and would have been predicated upon ‘the proposition that for obviously sound reasons 
the climate change impact assessment should precede the decision to authorize the project’.118 
However, as a result of the principles of severance and proportionality which the Court 
believed required it not to declare the whole of the administrative authorization decision 
invalid, but only the objectionable part, it reasoned that ‘such a remedy in the circumstances of 
this case might be disproportionate’.119 Was the Court being too cautious out of fear of 
engaging in judicial overreach, thereby possibly breaching the sacred lines of the separation of 
powers in doing so? Had it placed too much faith in the Minister’s duty to exercise her 
discretion in a balanced, well-informed and proper way, which in the end she seemingly had 
not? From a procedural, administrative justice perspective the Court was probably correct in 
following such a cautious approach that showed considerable deference to judicial restraint and 
respect for the doctrine of the separation of powers. Such restraint must be lauded in and of 
itself in a maturing constitutional democracy such as South Africa’s where the rule of law still 
struggles to find its feet. But it also highlights the limits and limitations of proceduralism. From 
a climate justice perspective we believe there was sufficient evidence of the likely grave 
impacts of the power station on people, their rights, the climate and the environment (evidence 
which was acknowledged throughout by the Court and by government) for the Court to have 
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pursued a more stringent remedy. This could arguably have justified setting aside the Chief-
Director’s decision, remitting the matter for reconsideration by him, or in such an ‘exceptional 
case’ even replacing or varying his decision through the provisions of PAJA mentioned above. 
It is quite possible that CER’s future planned challenge to the Minister’s appeal decision will 
reveal the extent to which another court might be willing to take bolder actions to ensure that 
power utility corporations abide by their legal obligations and government authorities consider, 
in a comprehensively balanced manner, all relevant climate change impacts in decision-
making. 
That said, in a recent analysis Humby lauded the Thabametsi judgment’s ‘meaningful 
contribution’ to climate change governance in South Africa, noting specially that the ‘court’s 
review of these decisions was framed by powerful statements associating climate change 
impact assessment with sustainable development, intergenerational justice, and the 
precautionary principle’.120 We agree. The Court’s innovative reliance on the precautionary 
principle to justify that climate change must be considered as part of the EIA process is 
especially noteworthy.121 So too is its reliance on the Constitution’s right to a healthy 
environment, and for connecting climate change in explicit, if not elaborate, terms with rights-
based concerns. In a passage worth quoting in full, the Court believed: 
 
Section 24 [the constitutional right to healthy environment] recognises the interrelationship 
between the environment and development. Environmental considerations are balanced with socio-
economic considerations through the ideal of sustainable development. This is apparent from 
section 24(b)(iii) which provides that the environment will be protected by securing ecologically 
sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and 
social development. Climate change poses a substantial risk to sustainable development in South 
Africa. The effects of climate change, in the form of rising temperatures, greater water scarcity, 
and the increasing frequency of natural disasters pose substantial risks. Sustainable development is 
at the same time integrally linked with the principle of intergenerational justice requiring the state 
to take reasonable measures protect the environment “for the benefit of present and future 
generations” and hence adequate consideration of climate change. Short-term needs must be 
evaluated and weighed against long-term consequences.122 
 
The Court also demonstrated its appreciation of the fact that climate change is a global concern 
that is governed not only by domestic policies and laws, but importantly, also by an 
international law framework which creates far-ranging obligations and offers best practices, 
and which can neither be ignored by the judiciary nor by environmental authorities in South 
Africa: 
 
Article 4(1)(f) of the UN Framework Convention [on Climate Change] imposes an obligation on 
all states parties to take climate change considerations into account in their relevant environmental 
policies and actions, and to employ appropriate methods to minimise adverse effects on public 
health and on the environment.123 
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While it must still consider amending the current EIA Regulations to explicitly include CCIAs, 
government published and further refined a set of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting 
Regulations in April 2017.124 In addition, the national Carbon Tax Act was assented to by the 
President in May 2019 and commenced on 1 June 2019.125 The Department of Environmental 
Affairs also recently published a Draft National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy which 
outlines a common vision of climate change adaptation and climate resilience for the country, 
as well as priority areas for achieving this vision.126 Alongside efforts to finalize South Africa’s 
climate change statute, we believe that collectively, these are positive developments that bode 
well for climate governance in the country, and they could further solidify the legislative 
foundation upon which future climate conflicts might be litigated by claimants and adjudicated 
by the courts. 
 
4.2 Nigeria 
Nigeria is Africa’s most populous and one of its most industrialized countries. The majority of 
the population, however, lives in abject poverty and collectively this ‘puts increasingly severe 
demands upon the natural environment, the institutional structures and the resources available 
to manage them’.127 Such demands and the associated potential conflicts arising therefrom are 
vividly explicated by the country's notorious oil and gas industry, the mainstay of Nigeria’s 
economy, the foremost source of national income and a source of deep, ongoing conflict at 
many levels.128 National law vests the exclusive right to the exploration and extraction of 
natural resources in the Nigerian federal government, with Shell oil company and the Nigerian 
government playing by far the most significant role in oil production in the Niger Delta in terms 
of a joint venture; the very same private-public venture that was also at the heart of the SERAC 
dispute referred to earlier. Since the 1950s, when oil was discovered in the area, oil production 
activities have caused immense damage to the environment as a result of oil spills and outdated 
waste disposal techniques, while gas flaring continues to be standard practice, resulting in oil 
wells accompanied by ‘a raging flame that burns twenty-four hours a day, reaching hundreds 
of feet into the sky, killing the surrounding vegetation with searing heat, emitting a deafening 
roar, and belching a cocktail of smoke, soot, and toxic chemicals into the air along with a potent 
mixture of greenhouse gasses’.129 A significant contributor to climate change, gas flaring has 
been the preferred means of disposing associated or waste gas by various petroleum and 
production companies in the Niger Delta for the past five decades.130 While the climate-related 
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ecological destruction occasioned by the foregoing is evident, the devastating socio-economic 
impacts on the local communities living in the Delta are also matters of grave concern, with 
the numerous climate related vulnerabilities of and impacts on rural Nigerians now well 
documented.131 
Nigeria's principal environmental law is the National Environmental Standards and 
Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act, 2007 (NESREA), which is 
complemented by the Environmental Impact Assessment Act, 2004 (EIA Act).132 The 
environmental agency established in terms of part 1 of the NESREA is empowered to enforce 
compliance with environmental regulations and standards.133 The lack of implementation and 
inadequacy of environmental law enforcement efforts are, however, major continuing 
concerns.134 Unlike its South African counterpart, the Constitution of Nigeria of 1999 does not 
provide for a right to a healthy environment. The article 24 environmental right in the African 
Charter is instead incorporated in Nigerian law by virtue of its inclusion in the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights Procedure Rules (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, 2004 
(ACHPR Ratification and Enforcement Act);135 a national statute that gives domestic effect to 
the Charter in Nigerian law. Nigeria also does not have a dedicated climate change law, 
although some policy directions in this area are captured in the National Adaptation Strategy 
and Plan of Action on Climate Change for Nigeria, 2011 and the National Policy on Climate 
Change, 2015. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the claims at the heart of the 2005 Gbemre dispute are based on 
virtually the same issues that gave rise to the claims in the SERAC Communication of 2001 
we have noted earlier. The Shell Petroleum Development Company Nigeria Ltd (SPDC) and 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) operate jointly and severally in the 
exploration and production of crude oil and other petroleum products in Nigeria and have been 
engaged in what has been referred to as ‘massive, relentless and continuous gas flaring’136 in 
the Ikwherekan Community. These entities have been flaring gas for years without adequately 
considering the health, environmental and other consequences of this practice while mainly 
concentrating on commercial interests and maximizing profit, at times without valid 
authorization (or ministerial gas flaring certificates) as required in terms of the Associated Gas 
Re-injection Act, 2004.137 
Against this background, the applicant in this matter, Jonah Gbemre, was granted judicial 
leave to apply for an order enforcing the ‘fundamental rights to life and dignity of [the] human 
person’ and the associated environmental and other rights in the ACHRP (Ratification and 
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Enforcement Act).138 Gbemre commenced court proceedings in his own name as well as on 
behalf of the Iwherekan Community139 in the Delta State of Nigeria against SPDC, the NNPC 
and the Attorney General of the Federation. The applicant sought five different remedies (four 
declarations and one judicial order) on the basis of a combination of the rights of the Iwherekan 
people vested in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1999, the ACHPR 
Ratification and Enforcement Act, as well as a range of Nigerian environmental laws. The 
complaint centered on the environmental and health impacts of gas flaring by the SPDC and 
the NNPC and the alleged subsequent human rights infringements.140 The court was requested 
to issue a declaration that: i) the constitutional rights to life and dignity of the human person, 
as reinforced by the ACHPR Ratification and Enforcement Act,141 included the right to a clean, 
poison-free, pollution-free and a healthy environment; ii) the actions of the SPDC and the 
NNPC in continuing to flare gas in the course of their oil exploration and production activities 
in the vicinity of the Iwherekan Community violated community members’ right to life 
(including the right to a healthy environment) and their right to human dignity; iii) the failure 
of the SPDC and the NNPC to carry out an EIA in the area where the Iwherekan Community 
lived to determine the effects of the gas flaring activities was a violation of section 2(2) of the 
EIA Act,142 while such a failure at once also contributed to several human rights violations; 
and iv) the provisions of sections 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Associated Gas Re-injection Act143 and 
section 1 of the Associated Gas Re-injection (Continued Flaring of Gas) Regulations144 that 
permit gas flaring, were inconsistent with the protection of human rights and consequently 
unconstitutional. The applicant also requested an order of ‘Perpetual Injunction’ restraining the 
SPDC and the NNPC as well as their agents, employees and contractors from future gas flaring 
in the area where the Iwherekan Community lived.145 
Particularly relevant to the present enquiry is the applicant’s assertion that the gas flaring 
‘gives rise to poisons and pollutes the environment as it leads to the emission of carbon dioxide, 
the main green house gas’;146 ‘(c)ontributes to adverse climate change as it emits carbon 
dioxide and methane which causes [sic] warming of the environment, pollutes … food and 
water’; and that it ‘(r)educes crop production and adversely impacts on their food security’.147 
The applicant claimed that the impacts of the unrestrained gas flaring on the lives and health 
of the community resulted in its members being ‘grossly undeveloped [and] very poor and 
without adequate medical facilities to cope with the adverse and harmful effects on their health 
and lives.’148 Clearly a predominantly rights-oriented case, the plea before the court was that 
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the rights to life and dignity entrenched in sections 33(1) and 34(1) of the Nigerian Constitution 
include the right to clean, poison-free and pollution-free air and a healthy environment 
conducive to human habitation, development and enjoyment of life. The applicant argued that 
these rights have been and continue to be violated and threatened by ongoing gas flaring 
activities in his community.149 
The respondents in this matter filed two separate counter-affidavits. They challenged the 
locus standi of the applicant on procedural grounds, stating that the applicant (interchangeably 
referred to as ‘the plaintiff’ in the judgment) was not authorized to represent the Iwherekan 
Community.150 They further countered all of the applicant's claims stating, among other 
objections, that their ‘gas operation is carried out in accordance with the Laws, Regulations 
and Policy of the Federal Government and in conformity with International Standards and 
Practices and these have no ruinous or adverse consequences to [sic] either health or lives’.151 
Moreover, they indicated that while SPDC has an oil mining lease and flare certificate, they do 
not have a flare site in the Applicant's community.152 The respondents further countered that 
when they commenced their operations in the area 37 years previously, an EIA was not a legal 
requirement and that there had not been any oil and gas development in the area where the 
community lived which required an EIA.153 The respondents also alleged that notwithstanding 
the fact that their operations posed no present or future danger to the community and its 
members, they typically also engaged in corporate social responsibility projects in the area.154 
As far as it concerned the applicant's claim of human rights abuses, the respondents stated that 
gas flaring was not a matter embraced by the constitutional right to dignity,155 and that ‘their 
operations [had] in no way affected the fundamental rights of the Applicant as alleged and that 
these oil and exploration activities [were] carried out in compliance with good oilfield practice 
and as permitted by the Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’.156 
After numerous and lengthy court proceedings including back and forth correspondence 
between the parties and the court (later described as ‘unduly lengthy submissions on 
miscellaneous issues like adjournment, transfer, stay of proceedings, stay of execution, notices 
of appeal, motions for stay at the Court of Appeal to restrain [the] Judge from sitting etc’),157 
Justice Nwokorie ruled on 30 November 2005 that ‘there must be an end to litigation, especially 
in this kind of specialized proceedings’.158 The court came to the conclusion that the rights to 
life and human dignity inevitably include the right to a clean, poison-free, pollution-free and 
healthy environment,159 and that the gas flaring in the course of the oil exploration and 
production activities amounted to a gross violation of these rights, to which the failure to carry 
out a compulsory EIA in terms of the EIA Act of Nigeria had contributed.160 The court also 
confirmed that the relevant sections of the Association Gas Re-injection Act and Regulations 
were unconstitutional, null and void on the basis of their being inconsistent with the rights to 
life and human dignity as well as the environmental and other rights in the ACHPR Ratification 
and Enforcement Act.161 The Court issued a restraining order prohibiting the SPDC and the 
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NNPC from any further gas flaring in the Applicant's community and ordered the Attorney-
General of the Federation and Ministry of Justice to commence legislative procedures to amend 
the relevant sections of the Gas Re-injection law with a view to aligning these with the 
Constitution.162 Notably, the court also considered section 7 of the Niger Delta Development 
Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004,163 clarifying that it is the responsibility of the 
Commission to ‘(t)ackle environmental problems that arise from the exploration of oil mineral 
[sic] in the Niger-Delta area and advise the Federal Government and the member-states on the 
prevention and control of oil spillages, gas flaring and environmental pollution’.164   
The cause of action in Gbemre, as in Thabametsi, evidently arose from within a context of 
powerful government-backed corporate concerns related to advancing the financial interests of 
the energy sector at the expense of the people and the environment. Far more than its South 
African counterpart, the Gbemre case almost entirely dealt with human rights issues and 
statutory environmental protection, including issues related to upholding the rule of law where 
national energy law that promotes oil extraction, allows gas flaring and consequently cause 
climate change, contradicts minimum constitutional human rights standards as a result. Similar 
to the ACommHPR in its SERAC Communication, the Court assumed a decidedly critical 
stance towards the socio-ecologically destructive activities of the government-owned energy 
company. It was especially critical of the delaying tactics employed by the respondents, which 
could easily have resulted in prohibitive costs and unnecessary postponement of corrective 
actions. To the court’s credit, it refused to allow drawn out judicial proceedings, which could 
be indicative of the urgency it attached to resolving the conflict in question, to recognizing the 
imbalance of power and resources among the litigants, and to providing appropriate remedies 
to the applicant sooner rather than later. 
In our view, the Gbemre case is first of all a victory for the interpretation and application of 
environmental rights. The court stated unequivocally that continuing to flare gas in the course 
of the respondents’ oil exploration and production activities in the applicant’s community is a 
violation of the community’s ‘fundamental rights to life (including [a] healthy environment) 
and dignity of [the] human person’.165 Even though the Nigerian Constitution does not provide 
for a right to a healthy environment, the court did not shy away from linking the rights to life 
and dignity to environmental interests (for instance by stating that life and dignity are linked 
to EIA concerns),166 or from affording significant weight to the statutory environmental right 
in article 24 of the ACHPR Ratification and Enforcement Act. 
The willingness of the court to find provisions of the Gas Re-injection Act unconstitutional 
also suggests that it was critical of the country's national law promoting economic growth at 
the expense of environmental and human health. It further suggests that the Nigerian court 
might have been slightly more adventurous than its South African counterpart in exploring the 
limits of the separation of powers by laying down very clear directions to the executive and 
legislative branches of government.167 In fact, the court went so far as to order an 
‘immediate’168 stop to gas flaring, while finding it meaningful to state that the absence of an 
 
162  Id. at 31. 
163  Niger Delta Development Commission (Establishment) Act, Cap N86, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 
2004. 
164  Gbembre, supra note 19, at 12. 
165  Id. at 30. 
166  Id. at 31. 
167  The court ordered the Attorney-General of the Federation and Ministry of Justice to ‘immediately set in 
motion, after due consultation with the Federal Executive Council, necessary processes for the Enactment 
of a Bill for an Act of the National Assembly for the speedy amendment of the relevant Sections of the 
Associated Gas Re-Injection Act and the Regulations made thereunder to quickly bring them in line with 
the provisions of Chapter 4 of the Constitution …’ (own emphasis). Gbemre, supra note 19, at 31. 
168  Gbemre, supra note 19, at 31. 
 26 
EIA was a contravention of Nigerian law, which contributed to the violation of the applicants’ 
rights to life and dignity and the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their 
development. To this end, the court order to stop the flaring of gas effectively muted the 
opportunity for the SPDC and the NNPC to retrospectively apply for an environmental 
authorization. 
While its human rights and broader environmental constitutionalism relevance is clear, its 
explicit relationship with climate change and its potential contribution to the climate change 
litigation discourse are arguably less evident, especially when compared with Thabametsi, 
where climate change was a centrally explicit theme throughout. This is because climate 
change does not constitute a central leitmotif that lucidly and consistently percolates through 
the arguments of the litigating parties and the court’s judgment. For example, the applicant 
argued that gas flaring ‘[c]ontributes to adverse climate change as it emits carbon dioxide and 
methane which causes [sic] warming of the environment, [and] pollutes … food and water’.169 
The applicant also urged the court to ‘hold that Gas Flaring has contributed to global warming 
of the Environment [sic] and depletion of the OZONE Layer [sic]’.170  
In sum, while the court was predominantly concerned with and devoted the bulk of its 
analysis to the impact of gas flaring on the rights of the Iwherekan Community, it did so without 
any detailed reference to and links with climate change. Had it more explicitly engaged with 
climate change, this might not have changed its finding and order in the present case, but the 
court would have been able to set an important precedent by more explicitly indicating the 
links between oil extraction practices, climate change-inducing gas flaring, ecological and 
human vulnerability and the associated human rights abuses; all critical issues in carbon 
energy-rich Nigeria. As a result, the court also missed an opportunity to elaborate on how the 
impact of such carbon-intensive activities on human health and well-being negatively affect 
the adaptive capacity and resilience of people in relation to climate change, now and in 
future.171 More disappointing perhaps, little was said about the liability and duties of petroleum 
companies in the context of climate change. This in our view represents a missed opportunity, 
early on, to have expressly confirmed on the basis of scientific evidence, the direct link between 
corporate driven and government-sanctioned carbon intensive activities and human rights 
abuses in Nigeria; a confirmation which could have gone a long way towards setting an 
important precedent for imposing human rights obligations not only on governments but also 
on corporations that contribute to climate change and associated human rights abuses. 
 
4.3 Uganda 
Uganda is a landlocked country172 and in comparison with its tumultuous colonial and post-
colonial past it is now relatively politically stable.173 Less industrialized and socio-
economically developed than South Africa and Nigeria, the country does have a wealth of 
natural resources including wetlands, forests, and rich biodiversity, which is threatened by 
deforestation, poaching and unsustainable land use practices.174 The Ugandan economy is 
industry and agriculture-based with many people depending on rural subsistence farming.175 
 
169  Id. at 5. 
170  Id. at 23. 
171  This is despite the fact that literature on the topic abounds. See, for example, Ite and Ibok, supra note 129, 
at 70-7; Elisha Jasper Dung et al., The Effects of Gas Flaring on Crops in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, 73 
GEOJOURNAL 297 (2008). 
172  The Commonwealth, Uganda (2019), http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/uganda. 
173  The Commonwealth, Uganda: History (2019), http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-
countries/uganda/history. 
174  The Commonwealth, Uganda (2019), http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/uganda. 
175  The Commonwealth, Uganda: Economy (2019), http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-
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The country is self-sufficient in producing food, but access to food is unevenly distributed 
among the population.176 Unsurprisingly, many of the reported impacts of climate change in 
the country are agriculture-related. They include changes in rainfall patterns, prolonged 
droughts, increasingly prevalent diseases like malaria in areas that were previously mosquito 
free, loss of soil fertility as a result of heavy rains, and an increased frequency of floods.177 The 
overall impact of climate change in Uganda has been described as increasing poverty, famine 
and food insecurity, with 90 per cent of the country’s natural disasters attributed to weather- 
and climatic factors.178 Flooding, coupled with a poorly maintained sanitation infrastructure, 
has led to an increase in waterborne and water-related diseases such as the sporadic outbreaks 
of cholera in Kampala.179 According to the Ugandan environmental authorities, while accurate 
data on pollution levels are limited, it is clear that air pollutants in Uganda originate mainly 
from imported second-hand vehicles, boiler emissions from industries, and the open-air 
burning of waste in city skips and landfills.180 The transport sector is reported to account for 
75 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions in the country, a contribution that is set to rise with 
considerably more vehicles expected to enter the transport sector in the near future.181 
Uganda’s first climate case was expected to commence towards the latter part of 2018, but 
at the time of writing, it is still pending. The Mbabazi-case is markedly different from its 
Thabametsi and Gbemre counterparts. It is unique in the sense that the plaintiffs are four 
minors, represented by a so-called next friend (prochein ami) and an NGO. The action has been 
brought on the plaintiffs’ own behalf, on behalf of the children of Uganda (both born and 
unborn), and in the interest of the general public. Fairly closely resembling atmospheric trust 
litigation in the Juliana and Urgenda cases, it is therefore a much broader public interest matter 
arising from the government’s alleged general inaction and failure to take measures to protect 
the Ugandan people from the impacts of climate change. It is accordingly neither explicitly 
directed at a specific carbon-intensive industry, nor at any one specific practice such as oil 
extraction, gas flaring or power generation that could cause climate change.  
The judicial process commenced as far back as 2012 with an amendment of the defendants 
in 2015.182 The papers (including the so-called ‘Plaint’ and ‘Summary of Evidence’) that were 
filed by the plaintiffs are publicly available,183 and they set out the main arguments and law on 
the basis of which the court will have to adjudicate the dispute. While we are obviously unable 
to provide an analysis of the case due to its not yet having commenced, we provide a brief 
synopsis of the main issues raised in the preliminary papers while we attempt to foreshadow 
some climate change issues that might arise during adjudication, including some of the unique 
features of this case that are already apparent.  
The case is an ‘urgent action’184 brought against the Attorney General of Uganda and the 
National Environment Management Authority in terms of articles 39, 50 and 237 of the 
 
176  International Labour Organisation (ILO) and Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), THE NATIONAL 
LABOUR FORCE AND CHILD ACTIVITIES SURVEY 2011/2012 2 (2013). 
177  Republic of Uganda, National State of the Environment Report for Uganda 19 (2014), 
http://nema.go.ug/sites/all/themes/nema/docs/FINAL%20NSOER%202014.pdf. 
178  Id. at 125. Some of the extreme climatic events the country faced in recent years include the Teso floods 
of 2007 and 2010, the Kasese floods of 2013 and 2014, the Bududu landslides of 2010 and 2013 and the 
landslide in Bulambuli in 2014. 
179  Republic of Uganda, supra note 177, at 125. 
180  Id. at 73. 
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182  Initially only the Attorney General was cited as the defendant. The National Environmental Management 
Authority of Uganda was added in 2015. 
183  See Sabin Centre for Climate Change Law, Mbabazi and Others v. The Attorney General and National 
Environmental Management Authority (2019), http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/mbabazi-et-al-v-
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 28 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 and sections 2, 3, 71 and 106 of the National 
Environmental Act (NEA).185 Under article 39 of the Constitution ‘[E]very Ugandan has a right 
to a clean and healthy environment’, while article 50 provides for locus standi measures. 
Article 237(2)(b) incorporates the notion of public trusteeship, stating that ‘the Government or 
a local government as determined by Parliament by law, shall hold in trust for the people and 
protect natural lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game reserves, national parks and any 
land to be reserved for ecological and touristic purposes for the common good of all citizens’. 
The NEA is an extensive environmental framework law, comprising of 108 sections and three 
schedules. The provisions cited in support of the plaintiffs’ case are all relevant to climate 
change; they deal with the statutory principles of environmental management, the rights and 
duties in relation to a decent environment, the authority of the courts to order an environmental 
restoration order, and the status and relevance of international environmental law in Uganda.186 
The plaintiffs’ plea in this case is not entirely coherent, nor is it backed by scientific 
authority or sufficient detail to support a clear case for causality and harm. No attempt is made, 
for example, to tie the Ugandan government’s climate-related duties in terms of its fiduciary 
role that is nestled in its public trusteeship duties to scientific evidence of a changing climate 
that is impacting on people and the environment. Yet the claim of the plaintiffs is clear, albeit 
broadly formulated: Uganda experiences some of the impacts of climate change (by way of 
violent storms, droughts, landslides and attendant harm to infrastructure),187 and the 
government as the public trustee is failing existing and future generations by not implementing 
measures to reduce the impact of climate change.188 The plaintiffs see the government's 
inaction as flying in the face of its obligations and dictates derived from international law,189 
and domestic laws and policies,190 while the government is said to be ignoring clear messages 
on climate change and its impacts emerging from ‘researchers and policy makers’.191 
On the basis of the available court papers, it is also not clear what type of climate response 
measures the Ugandan government must take or should have taken. The following is stated in 
rather vague and generalized terms:192 
 
The government has not implemented any of the major adaptation measures proposed and 
suggested by researchers and policy makers. 
The government inaction is unsustainable and is causing a lot of harm and suffering to the people 
of Uganda and the situation will be worse in future putting the lives of the plaintiffs at peril through 
no fault of their own. 
At the trial the plaintiffs shall aver, contend and prove that government inaction on climate change 
is responsible for loss of life, property, livelihoods and social and political discontent. 
 
 
185  National Environmental Act Cap. 153. 
186  Sections 2, 3, 71 and 237 of the NEA respectively. 
187  In this regard, the plaintiffs cite and have annexed reports of a number of events published in the media in 
2010 and 2011. 
188  Mbabazi, supra note 20, at paras. 7-12. 
189  Mention is made of the fact that Uganda is a signatory to the UNFCCC and that it is a party to the Kyoto 
Protocol, for example. The specific international law obligations of the Ugandan government are not stated. 
See Mbabazi, supra note 20, at para. 5. 
190  Mention is made of the Constitution of Uganda and the NEA alongside information taken from Uganda’s 
State of Environment Report 2004/2005 and other unspecified government publications. See Mbabazi, 
supra note 20, at paras. 4 and 5. 
191  Mbabazi, supra note 20, at para. 7. Also see paras. 5-6. 
192  Id. at paras. 7-9. 
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Instead of building a case around the specifics of activities, causal links, impacts and harm, the 
plaintiffs state their claims in rather abstract, broad-brush generalized terms, while relying on 
a mix of legal sources and policies to substantiate their submission that the government does 
not currently, but ought to, take action against climate change. Their intention to couch this 
case in human rights terms is evident from the fact that they primarily rely on the constitutional 
right to a healthy environment and the constitutional duty of the government to act as the public 
trustee.193 To this end they argue that there are several climate-related duties on government, 
including: i) the duty to maintain natural resources and to ensure their sustainable use on behalf 
of all Ugandans; ii) the duty to ‘ensure that the atmosphere is free from pollution for the present 
and future generations’; and iii) the duty to ‘uphold the citizens [sic] right to a clean and healthy 
environment’.194 Failure to execute these duties means ‘the plaintiffs have suffered, will 
continue to suffer and are likely to suffer more harm in future’.195 In setting out these duties, 
no distinction is made between matters of climate mitigation and adaptation and no direct or 
consistent correlations are drawn between the different climatic events listed in the Plaint (such 
as flooding, drought, and landslides), the claim that constitutional rights have been violated,196 
or the specific orders sought from the court. 
The plaintiffs’ prayers are instead many, non-specific, wide in scope and diverse, ranging 
from issues of climate mitigation, adaptation and adaptive capacity to matters of air pollution, 
compliance with international law and compensation for harm. They seek from the court (and 
we quote in full):197 
 
a) An order directing the Minister responsible for environment[al affairs] to implement measures 
that will reduce the impact of climate change. 
b) An order directing the Minister responsible for environmental affairs to conduct an updated 
carbon accounting [process] and develop a climate change mitigation (reforestation/emissions 
reduction) plan in accordance with the best available science, to reduce the impact of climate 
change. 
c) An order directing the Minister responsible to take measures to protect the plaintiffs and the 
children of Uganda from the effects of climate change and specifically extreme climatic 
conditions such as floods. 
d) An order directing government to implement international conventions, treaties and protocols 
on climate change. 
e) A declaration that the government holds in trust for the people of Uganda [including] present 
and future generations, all shared resources set out in Article 237 of the Constitution including 
the atmosphere. 
f) A declaration that government's failure to prevent and or curtail atmospheric pollution is a 
violation of the plaintiffs' right to a clean and healthy environment … 
g) An order directing government to compensate the victims of climate change and to take 
appropriate measures to curtail and prevent re-occurrence. 
 
A plain reading of these prayers offers at least two insights for now. First, the plaintiffs seem 
to seek judicial relief aimed at directing government to develop and implement an entire 
climate change regulatory response, which presently does not exist in Uganda. In essence, the 
Ugandan judiciary is asked to step in to compel the executive and legislature to fulfil their 
governance tasks as far as climate change is concerned. In addition, if the plaintiffs have their 
way in court, the Ugandan government should be subject to almost open-ended accountability 
 
193  Constitution of Uganda, sec. 237(2)(b). 
194  Mbabazi, supra note 20, at paras. 12(d)-(f). 
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and liability for the present and future impacts of climate change generally on people and on 
the environment. Ground-breaking as such an order would be for climate change governance 
and justice in Uganda and elsewhere, it is unlikely that a court would grant such an order (and 
even where it does so, that a government would unconditionally (be able to) observe it), 
especially if it were to observe the trias politica doctrine and the potential political and 
economic impacts of such a far-reaching decision on any government. Courts that strive to 
avoid being seen as abusing their judicial powers might not be open to granting blanket relief, 
but they might very well be willing to offer specific remedies targeted at addressing specific 
injuries that have been proven. We therefore believe that the plaintiffs should be more specific 
in crafting their plea for relief in this instance.  
Second, as a general rule it is difficult to establish juridically a causal link between activities 
that are alleged to cause climate change and an actually changed or changing climate, while 
the potential for success in climate change litigation on the plaintiffs’ part is decidedly 
diminished in instances where this is impossible or unlikely. The prayers cited above are so 
wide and virtually all-encompassing that it would arguably require considerable effort and 
evidentiary proof to convince a court that the government has been neglecting its duties in this 
respect. Moreover, the vague framing of the prayers might signal a lack of information on or 
knowledge of climate change law, policy and science on the part of the plaintiffs, as well as 
insufficient legal support in assisting to frame the issues, the claims and remedies, and to base 
these on sound legal arguments. While the matters that have been raised by the plaintiffs and 
the relief sought by them seem highly relevant as far as climate change is concerned, a sound 
juridical basis, properly supported arguments backed by sound evidence and authority, and a 
thoroughly meaningful application of the law are all wanting at present. To this end, the 
available court papers accentuate the importance of well-drafted complaints, careful legal 
footwork in terms of matters of cause, effect and harm, and the meaningful use of sound climate 
change science, data and information. 
It remains to be seen how this matter will play out in the Ugandan High Court. We suspect 
that much will depend on the veracity of the defendants’ counter arguments on the one hand, 
and on the other, the plaintiffs’ evidence to show that ‘government inaction on climate change 
is responsible for loss of life, property, livelihoods and social and political discontent’.198 The 
Plaint and the Summary of Evidence suggest that the case will have a strong constitutional law 
flair and that this matter will be adjudicated with reference to the notions of public trusteeship 
and intergenerational justice as well as human rights. Cases such as Juliana and Urgenda have 
an orientation more or less similar to that of Mbabazi, and it might be useful for the Ugandan 
High Court and the litigating parties if they were to consult these precedents in order to guide 




In addition to our findings above, we conclude our discussion here with a few additional 
observations. First, the Thabametsi and Gbemre judgments and the pending case of Mbabazi 
confirm the existence of a very thin line between environmental juridical dispute resolution 
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and climate change litigation. None of the cases discussed were based on ‘pure’ climate change 
laws, policies or claims, although all three were to a greater or lesser extent framed in terms of 
climate change conflicts. This is partly because none of the three countries have any elaborate 
climate change laws (yet), with South Africa and Nigeria the only countries boasting climate 
change policies. Climate-related claims in all three cases were instead supported by means of 
derivative and generic laws and rights such as statutory EIA laws, energy laws and 
environmental and associated human rights law. This suggests that the absence of specific 
climate change laws in African countries should not necessarily be an insurmountable 
impediment to climate change litigation, since those who seek to litigate on the basis of climate 
change considerations could use incidental laws (and perhaps even very effectively, if the 
outcomes of Thabametsi and Gbemre are anything to go by). Having said that, it might also be 
beneficial if African states were to commence adopting explicit climate-change laws (as Kenya 
did in 2016 and South Africa is expected to do in the near future),200 which could usefully 
foreground the biophysical elements of climate action on the continent, while entrenching 
climate change concerns far more prominently in the public and broader governance 
domains.201 The creation of climate laws could also have practical benefits. It is, for example, 
quite possible that if South Africa had a climate law demanding that decisions related to the 
construction of coal-fired power stations also include climate concerns at the core of initiating 
such decisions, or that CCIAs also be conducted as part of the EIA process, the Minister might 
not have been in a position to confirm the existing authorization by relying solely on energy 
security policies. Arguably, as African countries gradually start to develop climate change 
policies and more importantly, legislate climate change, it is likely that the trend, profile and 
nature, scope and reach of climate change litigation on the continent will also change. 
Second, we have indicated earlier that climate change litigation, novel and potentially 
significant as it may be, is also beset with several challenges. In the African context a major 
challenge seems to be a lack of sufficient legal counsel and associated legal aid, as suggested 
by Mbabazi’s sometimes incoherent legal arguments and ambitious but juridically and 
scientifically unsupported prayers. It is quite possible that access to scientifically sound data 
and information on climate change and laws and policies surrounding it may be restricted in 
some parts of the continent. Relatedly, although not at issue in any of the three cases we have 
analyzed, the identification of relevant legal authority and sources of law, especially in the 
highly specialized area of climate change, may be affected by African countries’ unique hybrid 
and pluralistic legal systems, which are often based on long-standing indigenous laws that 
regulate complex matters such as property law regimes, land tenure systems, rights in common 
property and shared natural resources.202 These uniquely African approaches to natural 
resource law and governance that are also prevalent in other countries of the Global South, 
might not always be seen to be compatible with or supportive of the highly technical Northern-
centric climate law paradigm, and vice versa.  
Third, with all three cases involving organs of state as the respondents or defendants, it 
would seem that there is not yet an appetite for climate change-related claims directed solely 
at the private sector. In Gbemre corporate and government interests were evidently conflated 
as a result of the government-corporate hybrid nature of the SPDC and the NNPC, and the 
court in question did not shy away from finding against this joint venture. Regrettably, the 
court did not elaborate the non-state, corporate obligations and implications of its order. While 
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it did not hesitate to deliver a finding that has specific and admittedly far-reaching implications 
for government, it remains unclear what the exact associated corporate liability and obligations 
are for non-state actors which, like Shell Nigeria in this instance, are often the main culprits 
causing climate change-related impacts and damage. In addition to suggesting that courts could 
be more adventurous in casting wider the liability net, this also points to the worrying 
consideration that many human rights obligations are still not enforceable against corporations 
when they cause environmental harm, despite legal developments auguring support for a 
gradual change of the law in this respect. The latter is evidenced by the Ruggie Framework of 
2008, which outlines possible duties on businesses to protect and respect human rights and to 
remedy human rights abuses.203 Until such time as climate related human rights obligations are 
actually enforced against corporations, a development in which courts could play a decidedly 
important role, the rights based-approach, potentially powerful as it may be, will have little 
effect against powerful and deeply vested corporate interests, their resulting climate change 
activities, and the associated impacts.  
Fourth, it is fairly clear that the plaintiffs in all three cases seemed to prefer holding 
governments to account based on their (constitutionally derived) fiduciary, human rights and 
public trust obligations. Mirroring trends in other Global South countries, the human rights 
approach to climate change litigation especially seems to be in vogue in Africa, with all three 
cases having drawn to a greater or lesser extent on this approach. While South Africa and 
Uganda have constitutionally protected rights to a healthy environment, the Nigerian court was 
willing to enforce an environmental right as drawn from African regional human rights law. 
Considering that in all three instances claims were brought against governments, it would seem 
that, in line with trends in other countries of the Global South such as Pakistan,204 climate 
change adjudication relates to the fight for the recognition and protection of African people’s 
human rights, with the obligations these rights impose squarely being directed at the state. 
Reliance on human rights suggests that matters of climate adaptation and human vulnerability, 
especially those relating to vulnerable indigenous communities, are major concerns in Africa. 
Rights-related matters such as human health, well-being, dignity, threats to basic livelihoods, 
development and the full enjoyment of life remain at the forefront of concerns in the African 
climate change litigation arena, a trend which is likely to continue. To this end, if Gbemre and 
Thabametsi are anything to go by, African courts could even be more open to embracing the 
possibility of looking directly at climate and related human rights obligations flowing from 
international and African regional law. As such it is possible that international climate and 
human rights law is set to influence climate change litigation in African countries,205 especially 
where courts are allowed to look to international law for judicial support and direction where 
domestic legal frameworks are lacking. Such a potential receptivity to and support of 
international human rights and climate laws must be encouraged at a time when some of the 
most influential global state actors, such as the United States and Australia, are turning their 
backs on binding international climate law obligations.  
Fifth, while the rights-based approach featured in all three cases, the far more 
administratively oriented, proceduralist, tick box-like EIA process also featured prominently 
in Thabametsi and Gbemre. The appeal of ELA in the Thabametsi case was that, as a matter of 
law and policy, EIAs for coal-fired power stations must also include climate change 
considerations in full, and/or the consideration of extensive CCIAs, while in Gbemre it was 
argued that the failure to carry out an EIA for gas flaring contravened EIA laws. EIA in this 
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context is generally understood to give effect to both the precautionary and preventive 
principles and is more specifically defined as:206 
 
The evaluation of the effects likely to arise from a major project (or other action) significantly 
affecting the environment. It is a systematic process for considering possible impacts prior to a 
decision being taken on whether or not a proposal should be given approval to proceed. EIA 
requires, inter alia, the publication of an EIA report describing the likely significant impacts in 
detail. Consultation and public participation are integral to this evaluation. EIA is thus an 
anticipatory, participatory environmental management tool.  
 
It would seem that tried and trusted environmental governance instruments such as EIA remain 
a popular remedy to try and foresee at least some of the deleterious environmental impacts and 
harms that may manifest now and in future as a result of carbon-intensive activities. In 
Thabametsi, the court ruled that government failed to apply its mind during the EIA and 
authorization stage, and that as part of the EIA process a CCIA needed to be conducted. In 
Gbemre, the point of the need for an EIA, or retrospective application of EIA law, became 
mute with the court's order that gas flaring be ceased, and the law be amended with speed to 
bring it in line with the Nigerian Constitution. Yet, considering the overall thrust of this court’s 
decision, it probably would presumably not have hesitated also to require an EIA, or even a 
CCIA, to be conducted. The court in Thabametsi should be lauded for its broad construal of 
‘environmental impact’ also to include climate impacts that specifically require assessment by 
means of a CCIA, a procedure that is still not explicitly required in terms of South African law. 
In doing so, the court was willing and able to innovatively venture beyond legislative 
limitations by deriving the existence of such an obligation from the more general EIA legal 
framework. While the court, arguably correctly so, stopped far short of stepping in as 
legislature to change the EIA law itself, such a creative interpretation and application of the 
law in a way that also encapsulates climate change concerns is both novel and most probably 
what would be required by courts (and litigating parties) in future where explicit climate laws 
and policies do not exist or where they do not explicitly require EIAs or CCIAs. That said, 
current critique also cautions against the effectiveness of EIA, which critique by implication 
also extends to CCIAs; novel and innovative as the latter may be.207 EIA is a mere decision-
making tool that feeds into but does not necessarily always determine the outcome of executive 
decisions: ‘[a]t the project level, the effectiveness of EIA is claimed to depend to a large extent 
on the actors involved, their interests and power positions, and the extent to which the most 
powerful decision-makers are open to environmental values and to revising their original 
plans’.208 As a case in point, even though a CIAA was eventually conducted in Thabametsi as 
a result of the court’s intervention, and despite the CIAA’s evidence of potentially far-reaching 
climate change impacts resulting from the proposed power station, the Minister authorized the 
activity with little regard to the findings and recommendations of the CIAA. In fact, she seemed 
to have ticked the legally required EIA box and then proceeded to justify building the power 
station based on non-binding pro-growth energy security policies. Given the limitations of 
proceduralism, we suggest that it would be unwise to predominantly rely on EIA or CIAA as 
the silver bullet for all climate change impacts emanating from industry.  
Finally, the concept of trias politica and its implied notion of judicial restraint observably 
influences, justifiably so in the context of the rule of law and the notion of the constitutional 
 
206  Stephen Jay et al., Environmental Impact Assessment: Retrospect and Prospect, 27 EIA REVIEW 287, 287-
8 (2007). 
207  Id. at 287-300; Jos Arts et al., The Effectiveness of EIA as an Instrument for Environmental Governance: 
Reflecting on 25 Years of EIA Practice in the Netherlands and the UK, 14 JEAPM 1 (2012). 
208  Arts et al., supra note 207, at 3. 
 34 
state or Rechtsstaat, the outcome and impact of climate change litigation. The courts in 
Thabametsi and Gbemre were willing to criticize the legislative and executive authorities for 
their failures in ensuring proper climate governance and to issue remedial measures to address 
these failures. In Thabametsi, the court pointed towards lacunae in the EIA regime, for 
example, but it arguably could have issued a more effective remedy that would have compelled 
the executive authority to change its initial authorization decision, while not infringing the 
separation of powers. The court in Gbemre followed an altogether more deliberately intrusive 
approach by finding the authorization of gas flaring under certain circumstances in terms of 
legislation to be unconstitutional. As a general observation, due to the limitations created by 
the separation of powers, the judiciary will often be reactive in how it rules on matters of 
climate change, while courts might not want to reform and are not always allowed (or even 
necessarily equipped) to reform the law or to make or change executive decisions related to 
everyday governance. They can, however, be bold in their pursuit of corrective justice in the 
face of climate change; an exciting possibility which in future might significantly bear on and 
influence modes and degrees of judicial oversight and judicial creativity. 
The impacts of climate change in Africa and on its people are numerous, diverse and 
distinctive, with the region expected ‘to be affected more severely than other regions’.209 The 
most recent IPCC Special Report titled Global Warming of 1.5°C confirms that Africa remains 
among the regions of the world projected to suffer most from the impacts of climate change 
while being the least able to adapt to its impacts and to bolster the resilience of its people and 
natural resource-based support systems.210 Predictably, these impacts emerge as a result of the 
ever-present binary inherent in the human development dilemma: the need for economic 
growth to improve resilience and adaptive capacity vis-à-vis the need to halt economic growth 
to limit environmental harm and to mitigate climate change. The pro-growth agenda on the 
African continent, as is the case elsewhere in the world, predominantly focuses on ‘maximising 
the value of economic, environmental and social resources within a neo-liberal approach’.211 
This is vividly explicated by the Minister of Environmental Affairs’ decision in the Thabametsi 
case to solely rely on energy security policies that promote economic growth instead of also 
considering climate and environmental protection policies as she was constitutionally and 
statutorily obliged to do in the first place. It is within this context that the phenomenon of 
climate change and the continuing need for economic development remain contentious issues 
and it is the many tensions that arise from this dilemma that will likely fuel climate conflicts 
on the continent, some of which will have to be resolved through litigation. Climate change 
litigation in Africa has already commenced, however tentatively, and we predict that it might 
become more frequent in future as people increasingly realize that the socio-ecological impacts 
of climate change can be influenced by courts in alternative, potentially far more effective, and 
sustainable ways.  
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